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Article 5

Section on Probate

THE LITTLE HORRIBLES OF A SCRIVENER
Henry M. Grether * t
The following articles on Nebraska probate administration
are based upon papers delivered at the Institute on Probate Administration presented by the University of Nebraska College of
Law and the Junior Bar Section of the Nebraska State Bar Association September 18 and 19, 1959. The articles are not meant
to be a summary of Nebraska probate procedure, but rather a
presentation of the highlights of the Institute.
The Editors
I.

INTRODUCTION

The following is a short discussion of selected common drafting problems confronting the scrivener of an ordinary will, excluding tax implications, problems created by renunciation or
widow's election, and problems of invalid provisions because of
public policy, the rule against perpetuities and other substantive
rules of law.
Common drafting errors to be avoided will be discussed by
way of illustration. These drafting "horribles" have been selected
as typical "drafting horribles" because of the frequency with which
scriveners have used these unwise provisions.
II.

A.

EXTREME BREVITY

EFFECT UPON ABATEMAENT

The first type of common error is extreme brevity which fails
for lack of completeness in successfully stating the intentions of
the testator.
In the first example, the client's assets consist of a modest
amount of miscellaneous property and about equal value in
"blue chip" securities and a farm, after deducting the amount of
the mortgage against the farm. He has a son, Bill, and a daughter,
*
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Mary, whom he desires to treat equally. He wants his son to have
the farm, and thus his will is as follows:
"I direct that all my just debts be paid.
"I give all of my securities to my daughter, Mary.
"I give, devise, and bequeath to my son, Bill, my farm
(legally describing it).
"All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, of whatsoever nature, and wheresoever located, I give, devise
and bequeath, share and share alike to my daughter, Mary,
and my son, Bill, absolutely and forever.
"I nominate and appoint my son, Bill, to be executor of
this, my last will and testament."'
This will is grossly inadequate. What if the testator has a
long serious illness and hospital bills are unpaid when he dies? It
is not unlikely that there may be insufficient personal property
to pay those hospital bills. Where is the money to come from?
Should Mary's securities be sold to make these payments? What
if Mary had been left a stated sum of money instead of the securities? It might be that after payment of the hospital bills there
would be an insufficient amount of personal property to pay the
legacy to Mary.
Thus, involved in this simple will are the questions:
(1)
Whether the residuary real estate as well as the residuary personal
property should be be used to pay the expenses of the last illness
and the costs of administration. (2) Whether the personal property should be used to pay off the mortgage on Bill's farm, and
(3) Whether the legacy should be charged against the real estate
in the residue.
In In re Patrick's Estate,2 the court said that it is presumed
that the intent of the testator is that a devisee of lands should
take them free from encumbrance. The case of Schade v. Connor,:]
stated further that the personal estate is a "natural and primary
fund" for the payment of debts and legacies. Thus, the general
rule is that the personal estate must be exhausted before the real
estate can be made liable.
However, it may be, in the above example, that the devise to
Mary was intended to be absolute and unconditional and thus not
1 For a discussion of this "horrible" see Kuhns, Some Suggestions Regarding Wills, 29 NEB. L. REV. 247 (1950).
2

72 Neb. 454, 100 N.W. 939 (1904).

3 84 Neb. 51, 120 N.W. 1012 (1909).
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affected by the rule that the personal
estate is the primary fund
4
for payment of debts and legacies.
There is also a question of whether a legacy is specific or
general. 5 A legacy is specific, when it it the intention of the
testator that the legatee should have the very thing bequeathed,
and not merely a corresponding amount in value. The distinction
between specific and general legacies is that the former singles
out the particular thing which the testator intends the donee to
have, no regard being had to its value, while the latter are payable out of the general assets, the chief element of the gift being
its value.

Generally where the estate assets are insufficient, abatement
will be in the following order: (1) Residuary estate, (2) Other
general legacies, and (3) Specific bequests or devises.
B.

EFFECT UPON CLASS DESIGNATIONS

Another example of extreme brevity is the following bequest
of a fund in trust:
"For my Aunt Mary for life and upon her death in trust
for my nephews and neices at their ages of 21."
To this language much can be implied. How many of the
following claimants are entitled to participate in this fund?
(1) The executor of a nephew living at the time of the
will who reaches twenty-one but predeceases the testator;
(2) A nephew born after execution of the will who
reaches twenty-one after the testator's death but before Aunt Mary's death;
(3) The executor of a nephew living at the testator's death
who thereafter reaches twenty-one and dies in the
life of Aunt Mary;
(4) A nephew born after the testator's death but in the
life of Aunt Mary, and who survives her and then
reaches twenty-one;
(5) A nephew born after Aunt Mary's death but during
the minority of the eldest nephew or niece, the claimant later reaching twenty-one;

4 Smullin v. Wharton, 86 Neb. 553, 125 N.W. 1112 (1910).
5 In re Estate of Grenier, 168 Neb. 633, 97 N.W.2d 225 (1959).
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(6)

A nephew born after Aunt Mary's death and after
the eldest nephew reaches twenty-one, the claimant
later reaching twenty-one.
After considering the enumerated possibilities, an informed person
must doubt that the scrivener's client had any clear notion of
what the language meant.
In another example of a common drafting "horrible, an
elderly testator tells his attorney that he wants to leave his property to his daughter Mary for life and then to her children. From
this embryo idea the attorney drafts a will in which he creates
a trust giving Mary the income for life, an appropriate power to
consume principal, and a power of appointment for the benefit
of her family. As to the power of appointment the will directs
the trustees:
"... to pay the principal among the children of Mary as
she shall by will appoint and in default of appointment
to the children equally." 6
Professor W. Barton Leach states that such a disposition is grave1
ly defective and suggests clauses to remedy the defects.
6 Leach, Powers of Appointment, 24 A.B.A.J. 807 (1938).
7

Id. at 811. Changes in the tax laws require some revision of the following suggested clauses:
....
3. Upon the death of my daughter, Mary, to pay the
principal to, or hold the principal for, such issue, spouses of
issue and widows and widowers of deceased issue of Mary as
she shall by will appoint. In the exercise of said power of appointment, my said daughter may appoint life estates to one
or more objects of the power with remainders to others; appoint
to grandchildren or more remote issue even though the parents
of such appointees are diving; impose lawful conditions upon any
appointment, provided that a condition must not cause the appointment to benefit any person not an object of the power;
impose lawful spend-thrift restrictions upon any appointment;
make appointments outright to an object or in trust for the
object; create in any object of this power a new power to appoint among some or all of my said daughter's issue or the
spouses, widows or widowers of the same; appoint by a will
which was executed before my death. But my said daughter
shall not release this power of appointment in whole or in part;
and, should any release be attempted, any appointment which
she makes by will shall be as effective as if no such release had
been attempted."
"... 4. Upon the death of my daughter, Mary to whatever
extent the trust estate is not effectively appointed by said Mary,
the trustee shall distribute the same to such of the issue of Mary
and in such shares and proportions as said issue would have
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C.

ESTATES By IMPLICATION

"To A for life, and if he dies without issue, to B."
If A dies leaving issue the problem is whether there is an
intestacy on A's death or whether a gift to A's issue will be implied. It seems peculiar that the testator provided for A's death
without issue and yet made no provision for A's death with issue.
The court, in Hunter v. Miller, 8 refused to imply a remainder in
favor of the issue of A.
Another illustration is whether a life estate to A will be implied from a gift to B after the death of A?9
In a third example of an incomplete expression, T devised
Blackacre to his brother Bill and his heirs on condition that Bill
should give a general release of all claims against the estate, within three months after the testator's death, and if Bill should give
no such release within three months then Blackacre should go to
Richard and his heirs. Examine this last situation and see if you
can detect a defect of incomplete thought which may cause a
problem. (What if Bill predeceases the testator?)
III.

OVER SPECIFICITY

Leaving examples of the incomplete expression, we next come
to the over specific clauses which have the effect of placing a
fiduciary in a legal strait-jacket from which he is expected to perform as some kind of economic and financial genius.' 0
A. INVESTMIENT CLAUSES
1. ".

.

. to be kept invested, at all times, in good, safe securities."

It is serious enough to restrict the trustee's investment power
to a legal list or some homemade substitute for it. It is worse
received the personal property of Mary under the laws of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in force at Mary's death, if
Mary had died intestate, domiciled in Massachusetts, having no
next-of-kin other than her issue and owning only personal property. Provided that, no person to whom any appointment is

made by Mary shall be entitled to receive any property distributed under this Clause (4) unless such person shall bring his
appointed share into the fund to be distributed in default of
appointment under this clause (4)."
8 109 Neb. 219, 190 N.W. 583 (1922). Cf. Bishop v. Bishop, 257 N. W.
40, 177 N.E. 302 (1931).
9 See Ralph v. Carrick, 5 Ch. D. 984 (877), 11 Ch. D. 873 (1879).

10 For a discussion of some specific pitfalls see SHATTUCK & FARR,
AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 61 (2d ed. 1953).
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to place an injunction upon the trustee, which by its own definition, is impossible to perform even assuming that anyone can
understand it. There is no such thing as a "good safe security."
The draftsman thinks he has made an intelligent specification;
but, in fact, the words have no ascertainable meaning.
The primary rule to follow is that no clause, phrase or word
should be employed which the draftsman cannot clearly expound
to a lay client. A secondary rule is that mandatory injunctions
with relation to management duties and investment participations
should be held to an absolute minimum.
2.

".

.

. to be kept invested in good income bearing securities."

Again the question, what are good income bearing securities?
To illustrate: Mr. A doubtless means well when he had his notary
prepare his will, but it contained a restriction that backfired. The
trust company which was appointed trustee had not been consulted, and upon conclusion of the executorship it was found that
the will expressly prohibited sale of Canadian Pacific stock. For
many years during the testator's lifetime this had been a good
investment and had paid handsome and regular dividends. He
doubtless figured it would always continue so and put ninetyeight per cent of his savings into the stock. He further provided
that the trustee could pay only income to the wife during her
lifetime.
Unfortunately, just after his death, the company passed its
dividend and no more were declared for ten years. The subsequent return to a paying basis was of no help to the widow or
the children during the intervening long and crucial time. The
trust company's hands were tied, and what could have been a bequest of security became one of enforced penury."
3.

".

.

. to be kept invested in first mortgage bonds."

To say that the trustee shall invest only in real estate mortgages is to make it impossible at some times to keep the funds
invested, and impossible at all times to keep the investments properly diversified.
4.

Clauses prescribing mathematical standards by which to select
investments.

These provisions apply particularly to municipal and industrial
bonds. In the former, such standards as population, outstanding
11 89 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 562 (1950).
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debts, and value of taxable property are used. In the latter, earn-

ings over a specified period of years, liquid assets, fixed charges,
dividend payment record and default in interest are used as stand-

ards. The problem here is that once the provisions are written
into the instrument, they cannot be changed after the death of the
testator, and thus fail to change with the above variables.
5.

Clauses specifying the proportions which the several types of
securities shall bear to the total.

In this situation, what is the trustee to do if he cannot find
securities in the specified amount? Diversification becomes inflexible.
6. Clauses restricting the investment in any one security to a
small specified amount.
The object is to provide for diversification. The danger is
that, as the size of the trust estate changes with the fluctuations in
the market value of the investments, the trustee may find himself guilty of breach of trust by going over the prescribed amount.
Viewed from the standpoint of the beneficiaries, this requirement
may produce over-diversification.
7.

Clauses specifying the time at which or the price for which
trust property shall be sold.

At the time of sale the market value may be at its lowest
and a reasonable price impossible to obtain. Specifying the price
for which the property shall be sold, the trustee is put at a disadvantage. If the trustee cannot get the price specified, does he
hold the property and perhaps let it deteriorate further? Or if
the specified price is below the existing market price, should the
trustee sell at the higher market price or the specified price? If
the market price is higher than the specified price, and the purchaser learns of the specified price, will not the purchaser only
offer the specified price?
8.

Clauses specifying the contingency (e.g. as when a security has
been in default a year) upon the happening of which property
shall be sold.

The default may have been under such conditions that the
sale of the security within that time would be disadvantageous to
the estate. Yet under such a condition, the trustee has no choice
in the matter.
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B.

PAYiENT OF DEBTS CLAUSES

Before including such a clause, one should ask the question:
Should any such clause be omitted entirely from the will? The
answer as to the following clause would definitely be in the affirmative:
12
I direct that all my just debts be paid.
Does the testator intend that all his just debts shall be paid
regardless of whether they are filed against the estate? A debt
not filed against the estate was upheld against the executor in
has been exHuebner v. Sesseman's Estate.13 Also, no intent
14
pressed as to the handling of unmatured debts.
A recommended clause reads:
I direct that the expenses of my last illness and burial and
that all just claims filed against my estate be paid when they
become due, provided, however, that my executor hereinafter
named may, inhis sole judgment and discretion, make immediate
payment of the present value of any unmatured claims. 15
C.

CoivMoN DISASTER AND

RELATED CLAUSES

Testator's concern is not whether the deaths are common or
whether they result from a common cause, which itself is a litigable issue. His problems stem from the possibility of disputes as
Life estates and
to who died first, or avoiding double estates.'
remainders are usually what the testator wants, unless the marital deduction is involved.
The objectives often sought to be met by such a clause include:
(1) A fear of double death taxes.
(2) The avoidance of successive administration expenses
and lawyer's and executor's fees, which cause further
diminution of an estate.
12 For a discussion of the "horribles" of this sentence see Kuhns, supra
note 1.
13 38 Neb. 78, 56 N.W. 697 (1893).
14 See NEB.REV. STAT.§§ 30-607, -608 (Reissue 1956).

"Present value" means at time of payment;
In re Estate of Larson, 138 Neb. 544, 293 N.W.430 (1940).
16 See Trachtman, Estate Planning, PRAC. LAW INST. at 55 (1959),
15 Supra note 1, at 259.

where the author suggests:

".

.

. Time consumed in discussing the

possible consequences of common disasters could be used more profitably in solving problems that are more likely to occur."
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(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

A childless husband may not relish the thought of
his wife's family enjoying his wealth shortly after
his death.
A legatee's widow may have her share of the legatee's
estate enlarged at the expense of the legatee's children
and that thought will trouble even those who highly
regard the in-law but are not unmindful of the possibilities of remarriage.
A testator may want a friend to benefit by the bequest but have no interest in the objects of the friend's
bounty.
In some situations the marital deduction is desired
only if the spouse is likely to outlive the testator by
many years.
The marital deduction may be desired even if the
spouse survives for but a moment.

A typical common disaster clause which appears frequently
is the following:
"If any legatee or devisee and I die as a result of a common disaster (or common accident, common calamity, or
during joint illness), the said legatee or devisee shall be
deemed to have predeceased me and this will and all its
provisions shall be construed upon that assumption and
basis."
This type of "horrible" is unsatisfactory in that:
(1) It frequently gives rise to litigation as to whether the
accident or peril or disaster was the cause of both
deaths.
(2) It fails to cover the rather rare case where the deaths
occur at about the same time from unrelated causes.
(3) It may result in leaving titles unsettled for years.
Husband and wife are in a motor accident. The husband dies shortly thereafter. The wife, badly crippled, lives on for years without recovering. When,
if ever during her life, may the husband's executor
17
safely pay her bequest?

D. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH CLAUSE
The simultaneous death clause fixes the order of deaths only
when there is insufficient evidence to establish who died first.
17

Bowe, Problems in Drafting Wills and Trusts, 37 NEB. L. REV. 127

(1958).
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What the testator intends is to avoid having his property pass
through the estate of a legatee who will not live long to enjoy it.
Such clauses do not carry out the testator's intention and are unsatisfactory in that:
(1)

(2)

They frequently fail to eliminate litigation. Whether
there is insufficient evidence to establish who died
first is itself a litigable issue.
They will bring about the very result the testator
desired to avoid if his legatee survives him by five
minutes.

A typical simultaneous death clause often used, but which
should be avoided, reads:
If any legatee or devisee dies simultaneously with me or
under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence
of survivorship, I hereby declare that I shall be deemed to have
survived such legatee or devisee and this will and all its provisions shall be construed upon that assumption and basis.s
E. TnvE CLAUSE
The time clause will almost always avoid litigation except for
the rare case where the bodies are found after a considerable
period of time and hence the time of the testator's death cannot
be determined. Such a clause should solve problems of simultaneous death cases and practically all of the common disaster
cases.
A suggested form of the time clause is:
For the purpose of this will, a person shall not be deemed
to survive me if such person dies within - days of my death,
nor to survive another if such person dies within - days of
the death of such other.19
IV.

DRAFTING ERRORS

A. AMBIGUOUS WORDING
Too many drafting errors are purely semantic in that the
language may not be too clear or it may be merely incomplete
or perhaps otherwise ambiguous, thus failing to state its intent
1s Id. at 128, See also Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 30-121 to -128 (Reissue 1956).
19 Supra note 16, at 56. In order to qualify for the marital deduction
the surviving spouse's interest cannot be made to terminate in a time
longer than six months following the decedent's death. See INT.

REV. CODE of 1954 § 2056 (b) (3).
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effectively. The scrivener may have failed to foresee and provide for all contingencies that may arise.
For example: a definite beneficiary of a trust is necessary.
A trust can be created in favor of beneficiaries not specifically
named in the trust instrument if they are ascertainable from other
facts having significance independent of the testamentary disposition.20 However, the description of the beneficiary must be
sufficiently definite so the person intended can be identified. In
the following illustration, are the beneficiaries too indefinite to
be determined?
".. . to be distributed by my executors as they see fit
among my friends."
Possible solutions to the above illustration would be to list
the bequests directly in the will or codicil or incorporate by reference a list described and in existence.
Bad solutions which should not be followed include leaving
the property outright to the executors or other named legatees,
using precatory, not mandatory, language relating to the desired
distribution. Avoid giving property to A "to be held by him in
accordance with the instructions which I have given him or will
give to him hereafter."2 1

B. PROBLEMS RAISED BY END-LIMITATIONS
After the will or trust instrument has provided for all of the
primary objects of the testator's or settlor's bounty and perhaps
after considerable attention has been given to providing alternatives for the various contingencies which have been foreseen, the
scrivener often finishes with some limitation such as ". . . to my
heirs." These ending provisions are called "end-limitations."
They are often ambiguous and the cause of bitter law suits because the same care and thought given to the drafting of the will
or trust up to this point is not used on the "end-limitation."
The meaning of "heirs" is ambiguous in that the word has a
primary and a secondary meaning. Using the primary meaning
the "heirs" are computed as of the date of the testator's death.
Under the secondary meaning the "heirs" are computed other
20 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 54.2
21

(2d ed. 1956); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 106 at 495 (1935); Restatement (Second) Trusts § 54 d.
SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 52, 164.1 (1939); Cf. Restatement (Second),
Trusts §§ 40, 40.1, 112.
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than at the time of the testator's death, normally at the termination of a life estate.
The testator usually intends the secondary meaning under
most fact situations where the question arises, but the orthodox
rule of law gives "heirs" the primary meaning. Litigation has
often resulted because too little attention is paid to this section of
the will.
In the case of In re Estate of Pfost,22 a fund of 12,000 dollars
was required to:
* * *be divided equally, in equal shares, share and share alike
between my son Hugh Pfost, and my twelve (12) grandchildren
being the eight (8) children of my daughter Iva L. Foss, and
the four (4) children of my son Hugh Pfost. [Emphasis added]
The litigation was concerned with whether the fund should
be divided into thirteen equal parts, or into two equal parts with
one share going to Hugh Pfost and the other share being divided
equally among the twelve grandchildren. The court gave the
preposition "between" its literal and grammatical meaning and
awarded half to Hugh Pfost and the other half to the grandchildren.
And in Kramer v. Larson,2 3 a will recited:
All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal, wheresoever situated, I give, devise and bequeath
to my heirs at law and next of kin, share and share alike, ....
The problem in this case was whether the residuary estate
should be divided per stirpes (seven parts) or per capita (twentyfive parts). It was held that the phrase "to my heirs at law" designated the residuary beneficiaries and the words "share and
share alike" prescribed the manner in which the beneficiaries
should take. The case held the heirs took per capita even though
related in different degrees of consanguinity to the testator. The
brothers, sisters, neices and nephews were treated as constituting
but one class of devisees, since by the will, they had not been
separated into different classes, and the will showed no contrary
intent.
In a third situation, the problem arose as to the time for
determining who were the "heirs" described in the following
24
language:
If Christina C. Dunlap shall die before I do and there shall
be no heirs born to me, then and in that case all of my property
22
23
24

139 Neb. 784, 298 N.W. 739 (1941).
158 Neb. 404, 63 N.W.2d 349 (1954).
Dunlap v. Lynn, 166 Neb. 342, 89 N.W.2d 58 (1958).
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above described and all other property, both real and personal

which shall belong to me at my demise shall descend to the
heirs of Christina C. Dunlap share and share alike, and should

there be grandchildren of the said Christina C. Dunlap they shall
share and share alike of the share falling to their parent, under
this will.
The available solutions for computing the time were:
(1) 1913, the date the will was executed:
(2) 1924, the date the testatrix's mother died;
(3) or, 1956, the date that the testatrix died.
The family tree of the testatrix is as follows:

I
I

Testatrix's

Testatrix's

Mother
died 1924

Father
died 1929

I
I

I
I

Testatrix

Brother

Sister

Sister

Brother

died 1956

died 1930

1/4

died 1942

no children

__ _

I
I
Nephew
1/8

_ _]

I
I

I
I
I[

I
I
I

Niece Niece
1/8
0

I
I
1/4

I
I
Niece
1/8

Niece
1/8

The heirs were computed as of the date of the testator's
death, which was the secondary meaning of heirs. The primary
meaning would have computed the time as of the date of the
ancestor's (mother's) death. If the court had taken the latter
meaning, the husband would have received 1/3d of the estate and
the grandchildren, including the testatrix, each would have received 2/15. The court, however, distributed the estate giving an
undivided 1/4th each to the son and daughter of Christina C. Dunlap and an undivided 1/8th each to one grandson and three granddaughters. See the family tree above.
The moral of the story is that all gifts to heirs or issue should
declare at what time or times heirs are to be determined and
whether distribution is to be made on a stirpital or per capita
basis.
In Abbott v. Continental National Bank,25 the controversy was
over the following clause in a will.
In the event my daughter Elizabeth Margaret Woodward shall
predecease my wife without issue then living, then and in that
2r 169 Neb. 147, 98 N.W.2d 804 (1959).
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event I order and direct my trustees to pay the income of such

trust fund to my wife, Zula E. Woodward during her natural life,
and upon her death to pay the principal thereof to my legal
heirs.
The surviving wife of the testator and the surviving husband
of Elizabeth Margaret Woodward contended that they held the
remainder interest in the trust estate as the legal heirs of the
testator. The court held the phrase "to my legal heirs" to mean
the heirs who would take if no disposition of the property had been
made under the will. Therefore, the plaintiff wife had no right
in the remainder interest of the trust property and that such remainder interest, upon the termination of the trust, was in the
heirs of the testator computed as of the date of the termination
of the trust.
C.

GiFT IN TRUST TO USE THE INCOMiE

A gift in trust to use income for nieces, nephews and "such
other of my relatives" was involved in Applegate v. Brown.2 The
court said here the language "my relatives" meant relations of
the blood of the testator and did not mean relatives by affinity,
and that such relation included the mother, brothers and sisters,
nieces and nephews of the testator. The court applied the common
law rule of convenience to close the class to after born persons as
of the date of the testator's death.
It is difficult to tell whether the court failed to realize that
the rule of convenience would not normally be so applied to a
gift of income as distinguished from a gift of corpus, or whether
the court failed to articulate its reasoning that the ordinary rules
of construction will yield so as to make a2 7 gift valid rather than
invalid under the rule against perpetuities.
D.

A DEVISE TO A, AN IHIYR DECENDANTS-RULE IN WILD'S CASE

In a suit to obtain specific performance of a contract for the
sale of real estate the controversy involved whether the language,
26 168 Neb. 190, 95 N.W.2d 341 (1959).
27 In the motion for rehearing, which was denied, the plaintiff, Applegate, contended that in its decision the court misapplied the "Rule
of Convenience" pointing out that all prior authority had held the
rule inapplicable to gifts of income. Cases supporting this view are:
In re Wenmoth's Estate, 32 Ch. D. 266 (1887); In re Letcher's Estate,
302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d 984 (1946); Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co.,
188 Md. 178, 52 A.2d 100 (1947); In re Earle's Estate, 369 Pa. 52, 85
A.2d 90 (1951).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
"To my daughter, Polly Anna Ludlow, and her descendants"
vested a fee simple title in Polly or a life estate only, with a remainder in her descendants. 28 The court held that the language
was controlled by the Uniform Property Act 29 and that a devise
to a person and "to his descendants" created only a life estate
in that person and a contingent remainder in his descendants as
a class. This made Polly's title unmarketable and specific performance under the contract was denied.
V. CONCLUSION
Drafting "horribles" can be avoided if the scrivener carefully
constructs a complete check list and uses his check list conscientiously.30 The conscientious scrivener should make an outline
of all possible contingencies that may arise before starting to draft
the instrument. While composing, he should check and double
check his work to insure correctness and exactness. Once the instrument is drafted, let it cool off and then always, when possible,
have an assistant or an associate check the drafting thoroughly.
Remember a will clause may prove to be a "horrible" either because of its extreme brevity or because of its overspecificity and
if it is neither too short nor too long it may nevertheless be ambiguous because of semantic considerations or technical legal
rules of construction. Oftentimes the most frequently used expressions become unclear.

Ellingrod v. Trombla, 168 Neb. 64, 95 N.W.2d 635 (1959).
29 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-101 to -123 (Reissue 1958).
30 See check list suggested in 85 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 15 (1947);
2 P-H WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUST SERVICE f 20,108 to 113,
20, 403, 20,404; WORMSER, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ESTATE
PLANNING 168-82 (1948); WORMSER, PERSONAL ESTATE PLANNING IN A CHANGING WORLD 293-300 (1948). The check lists
cited take distinctly different approaches to the form of the check
list and the best results probably would be obtained by using some
combination of these different lists.
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